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INTRODUCTION 
As I write in the winter of 2020, the health, fiscal, and, frankly, 
humanitarian crises confronting U.S. cities continue unabated.  The 
COVID-19 pandemic has required local governments to spend more 
to retrofit public spaces, increase cleaning frequency and protocols, 
and expand the work of public health departments.  In addition, many 
local communities have allocated funds to address deepening problems 
of poverty and hunger and have provided cash assistance to struggling 
local businesses.1  Meanwhile, local revenue collections shrank 
 
* Associate Professor of Law, Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, Arizona State 
University. I would like to thank the editors of the Fordham Urban Law Journal for 
organizing such a terrific symposium and for providing valuable feedback on this 
Essay, as well as my co-panelists Nestor Davidson, Blaine Saito, and Darien Shanske 
for stimulating such an exciting conversation. I also want to acknowledge the 
thoughtful questions raised by Gaga Gondwe. Sean Dix provided excellent research 
assistance.   
 1. See, e.g., DHCD Tenant-Based Rental Assistance Program, GOV’T D.C., 
https://coronavirus.dc.gov/page/dhcd-tenant-based-rental-assistance-program 
[https://perma.cc/6A3E-SV7Q] (last visited Feb. 21, 2021); Fair Housing/COVID-19 
Emergency Assistance Program, CITY OF SAN ANTONIO, 
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significantly.  While not as deep as predicted in March 2020, cities face 
considerable budget shortfalls.  To take a few headline numbers, New 
York City faces a $3.8 billion shortfall;2 in October 2020, Chicago 
predicted a $1.2 billion shortfall;3 and as of December 2020, Los 
Angeles officials were struggling with a $675 million shortfall,4 while 
San Diego faced an $86 million shortfall.5 
The pandemic has been especially harsh on the economies of large 
urban areas.  However, even smaller urban communities face 
significant shortfalls.6  Meanwhile, a meaningful federal response was 
 
https://www.sanantonio.gov/NHSD/Programs/FairHousing [https://perma.cc/HXV6-
62GY] (last visited Feb. 13, 2021); Anthony Derrick, Mayor Jenny Durkan Announces 
Initial 250 Grantees of the Small Business Stabilization Fund, Calls on Private Sector 
and Philanthropy to Help Support Future Grants, OFF. MAYOR (Apr. 13, 2020), 
https://durkan.seattle.gov/2020/04/mayor-jenny-durkan-announces-initial-250-
grantees-of-the-small-business-stabilization-fund-calls-on-private-sector-and-
philanthropy-to-help-support-future-grants [https://perma.cc/JPM7-A5PJ]; Small 
Business Emergency Relief Fund, DENVER, 
https://www.denvergov.org/Government/Departments/Economic-Development-
Opportunity/Pandemic-Relief-Recovery/Small-Business-Emergency-Relief-Fund 
[https://perma.cc/XB4L-MY7J] (last visited Feb. 21, 2021). My research assistant, 
Diego Brito, put together a more comprehensive list of these programs. It is on file 
with the editors of the Fordham Urban Law Journal. 
 2. See Emma G. Fitzsimmons & Jeffery C. Mays, Pandemic’s Fiscal Toll on New 
York City: 5 Takeaways, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/24/nyregion/coronavirus-budget-nyc.html 
[https://perma.cc/X795-QXG7]. 
 3. See Fran Spielman, City’s Proposed Budget Will Erase $1.2 Billion Shortfall — 
and Without More Federal Help, Top Mayoral Aides Say, CHI. SUN TIMES (Sept. 3, 
2020, 12:30 PM), https://chicago.suntimes.com/city-hall/2020/9/3/21420104/chicago-
budget-2021-federal-strimulus-replacement-revenue-lightfoot [https://perma.cc/46SJ-
Z6FP]. 
 4. See David Zahniser, L.A. Vowed to Cut Police and Help Disenfranchised 





 5. See David Garrick, San Diego Faces Large Budget Deficits as Pandemic 




 6. See Dorian Hargrove, Alexis Rivas & Tom Jones, Small Cities with Large 
Budget Shortfalls Find Little Help from CARES Act, NBC 7 SAN DIEGO (June 16, 
2020, 7:53 PM), https://www.nbcsandiego.com/news/investigations/small-cities-with-
large-budget-shortfalls-find-little-help-from-federal-cares-act/2348284 
[https://perma.cc/LX42-LNBU] (finding National City in San Diego County has 
projected revenue loss of $4.8 million but only received $1 million from the CARES 
Act); Michael A. Pagano & Christopher W. Hoene, City Budgets in an Era of 
Increased Uncertainty: Understanding the Fiscal Policy Space of Cities, BROOKINGS 
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slow to materialize.  In a functioning federalist system, one might 
expect the central state to quickly address state and local fiscal 
challenges that are national in scope.  Not only would such funds 
ensure state and local governments had the money to invest in their 
responses to the pandemic, but they would also prevent public sector 
cuts that would otherwise deepen the economic recession.  While 
Washington managed to pass one round of stimulus for U.S. workers 
and businesses,7 local governments began making cuts almost 
immediately.8  At least some political leaders in Washington seemed to 
believe that the current fiscal crisis confronting local governments is of 
their own making.9  This kind of talk is obviously not grounded in 
reality, though budget decisions made prior to the pandemic limit local 
options to respond prudently.  The American Rescue Plan passed in 
March of 2021 provides meaningful federal dollars to assist local 
 
INST. (July 18, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/city-budgets-in-an-era-of-
increased-uncertainty [https://perma.cc/489W-2C8G] (arguing that most urban areas 
lack the taxing authority and flexibility to respond to a financial crisis and that the size 
of any federal response should be based on the constraints placed on each city); 
Associated Press, ‘We Need Help’: Small Cities Face Fiscal Calamity from 
Coronavirus, L.A. TIMES (June 10, 2020, 3:15 PM), https://www.latimes.com/world-
nation/story/2020-06-10/we-need-help-small-cities-face-fiscal-calamity-from-virus 
[https://perma.cc/D2SZ-XMJZ] (“The federal CARES Act sent $150 billion to states 
and the nation’s most populous cities and counties to help them pay for expenses 
related to the virus outbreak. But only 36 cities met the population threshold of 500,000 
or more to qualify for the money.”). 
 7. See Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, 
§ 2104(b)(1), 134 Stat. 281, 318 (2020) (expanding unemployment insurance eligibility 
and providing an additional $600 in unemployment benefits per week); § 6428, id. at 
335 (making immediately available a refundable tax credit termed an “Economic 
Impact Payment” of $1,200 for eligible adults and $500 for up to two children per 
household). 
 8. See David Harrison, State, Local Governments Slashed Spending After 
COVID. Next Year Could Be Worse., WALL ST. J. (Nov. 29, 2020, 12:00 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/state-local-governments-slashed-spending-after-covid-
next-year-could-be-worse-11606669200 [https://perma.cc/49Q6-KCPV] (“State and 
local government spending on public services fell at a seasonally adjusted annual rate 
of 3.7% in the third quarter from the second, according to the Commerce Department. 
That followed a 6% decline in the second quarter, the sharpest since 1952.”). 
 9. See Eric Levitz, The GOP’s Big Lie About Why COVID Relief Talks Failed, 
N.Y. MAG. (Aug. 11, 2020), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/08/republicans-
covid-stimulus-negotiations-fiscal-aid-states.html [https://perma.cc/2926-2786]; 
Christina Wilkie, Trump Says Coronavirus ‘Bailouts’ for Blue States Are Unfair to 
Republicans, CNBC (May 5, 2020, 3:56 PM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/05/coronavirus-trump-says-blue-state-bailouts-unfair-
to-republicans.html [https://perma.cc/X8QR-YWN5] (“‘We’re not interested in 
solving their pension problems for them, we’re not interested in rescuing them from 
bad decisions they’ve made in the past,’ McConnell said in a televised interview in late 
April.”). 
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governments with revenue shortfalls, but delays in this assistance 
complicated local governments’ response to the pandemic.10   
The current recession is an unlikely place to draw meaningful lessons 
about local fiscal health and local financial crises.  The fiscal challenges 
currently confronting urban areas in the United States are sui generis.  
We are facing a global economic contraction, unprecedented since the 
Great Depression, driven by public health regulation and advice that 
discouraged consumer spending.11  Rebuilding the economy requires 
an effective public health response,12 and the speed at which urban 
environments will recover will depend on how quickly residents and 
tourists feel it is safe to resume normal life.  Scientists have produced a 
miracle: vaccines that are 90% effective in record time.13  But how 
quickly this miracle will result in meaningful public health 
improvements in the United States remains to be seen, as the vaccine 
rollout was slow and uneven in its early days.14 
In the fall of 2020, I flew to New York City for less than 24 hours to 
attend a shiva.  When will I feel comfortable doing that again?  When 
will global travelers return in large numbers to New York?  When will 
a U.S. passport once again be a gateway to the world?  These questions 
are beyond the scope of this Essay and this symposium, but the answers 
are at the heart of how long it will take for the U.S. economy (and that 
of its urban areas) to recover and how such recovery might look. 
 
 10. See American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, H.R. 1319, 117th Cong. (2021). Though 
this Essay was published in the spring of 2021, it was written in the winter of 2020. The 
world changed quickly. But it remains true that the ability of the federal government 
to approve an aid package depended on the outcome of two Georgia run-off elections. 
This is not a robust system of fiscal federalism, even if the aid dollars are currently 
flowing. 
 11. See INT’L MONEY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK UPDATE: A CRISIS LIKE 
NO OTHER, AN UNCERTAIN RECOVERY 2 (2020), 
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2020/06/24/WEOUpdateJune2020 
[https://perma.cc/PP7V-LKWP] (“Economic data available at the time of the April 
2020 WEO forecast indicated an unprecedented decline in global activity due to the 
COVID-19 pandemic. Data releases since then suggest even deeper downturns than 
previously projected for several economies.”). 
 12. See id. at 12. 
 13. See Katie Thomas, David Gelles & Carl Zimmer, Pfizer Early Data Shows 
Vaccine Is More Than 90% Effective, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2021), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/09/health/covid-vaccine-pfizer.html 
[https://perma.cc/EP4W-9CFP]. 
 14. See Rebecca Robbins, U.S. Officials Say Covid-19 Vaccination Effort Has 
Lagged, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/30/health/covid-vaccines-slow-rollout.html 
[https://perma.cc/HTK5-7U9G]. 
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Though this unique crisis is the result of public health measures, and 
recovery depends on the success of such measures, it has also exposed 
the fragility of local revenue and highlighted the fissures in the U.S. 
body politic.  The problem of local revenue sufficiency is not new, nor 
is the tendency of state and national leaders to blame local fiscal 
problems on local choices alone rather than understand them to be the 
result of decisions made at the local, state, and national levels.15 
This Essay proceeds in three parts.  Part I describes the brokenness 
of U.S. fiscal federalism, which has both devolved significant 
responsibility to local governments and left them without the fiscal 
tools commensurate with this responsibility.  Part II discusses the ways 
that local governments have sought to secure own-source revenue in 
the context of declining state aid and state-imposed revenue 
restrictions, including the choices cities have made or are considering 
in their fiscal year budgets for 2021.  Part III argues that if localities are 
really on their own, they should be given the fiscal tools necessary to 
respond to local problems, including significantly more taxing 
authority. 
I. FISCAL FEDERALISM IN DECLINE 
A. Fiscal Federalism 
Fiscal federalism is an account of how different levels of government 
(federal, sub-federal, and local) raise and spend revenue.16  It cautions 
against redistribution at the local level for fear that such policies will 
drive exit, which is relatively easy at the local level.17  (It is manifestly 
harder to expatriate than to move to suburbia).  As a result, 
conventional wisdom suggests that the national government should pay 
for redistribution.18 
In the United States, the federal government can also more easily 
spend counter-cyclically.  While other countries allow sub-federal 
governments to borrow,19 in the United States, balanced-budget 
requirements restrict state governments’ ability to engage in 
 
 15. See infra Part I. 
 16. See Richard M. Bird, Fiscal Federalism, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TAXATION 
AND TAX POLICY 146, 146–47 (Joseph J. Cordes et al. eds., 2005). 
 17. See id. at 147. 
 18. See id. 
 19. Canadian provinces, for example, can borrow. See Kyle Hanniman, COVID-
19, Fiscal Federalism and Provincial Debt: Have We Reached a Critical Juncture?, 53 
CANADIAN J. POL. SCI. 279, 279 (2020). 
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countercyclical spending.20  Thus, conventional fiscal federalism 
assumes that a central state would lead the response both to a global 
public health crisis caused by an easily communicable disease and to its 
resulting economic crisis.  A federal government can more easily 
coordinate the response by, for example, centralizing the purchase and 
distribution of personal protective equipment and testing equipment.21  
And governments with independent currencies can more easily borrow 
to pay the costs of such a response. 
The legal authority granted to local governments by state law 
assumes functioning fiscal federalism.  Such authority seems to 
contemplate that local governments are chiefly responsible for 
supplying local public goods and coordinating local services, including 
trash collection, local parks, and public safety.  The local property tax 
imposes something akin to a benefits tax in that property values reflect 
the value of such services to taxpayers, implicitly limiting 
redistribution.  But, of course, this is a vast oversimplification.  In the 
1950s and 1960s, policymakers called for local commuter taxes, 
recognizing that commuters benefit from the services a city provides.22  
The campaign for equity in education funding, including both litigation 
and advocacy, has shifted thinking around education.  As a result, 
 
 20. The vast majority of states have constitutional balanced budget requirements, 
which prevent state deficit spending. See NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 
NCSL FISCAL BRIEF: STATE BALANCED BUDGET PROVISIONS 2 (2010), 
https://www.ncsl.org/documents/fiscal/StateBalancedBudgetProvisions2010.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3PP9-DNBX]. Forty states place additional restrictions on 
borrowing. The details of these rules, and in particular what types of borrowing are 
subject to these rules, vary considerably. See Kim Rueben & Megan Randall, Debt 
Limits: How States Restrict Borrowing, URB. INST. (Nov. 2017), 
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/publication/149161/debt-
limits_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/44ZK-4D5U]. But see Darien Shanske & Davide 
Gamage, The Case for State Borrowing as a Response to the Current Crisis, 97 TAX 
NOTES ST. 1137, 1139–41 (2020) (suggesting more room for states to borrow than has 
traditionally been believed). 
 21. Cf. Clary Estes, States Are Being Forced into Bidding Wars to Get Medical 
Equipment to Combat Coronavirus, FORBES (Mar. 28, 2020, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/claryestes/2020/03/28/states-have-are-being-forced-into-
bidding-wars-to-get-medical-equipment-to-combat-coronavirus/?sh=1eacb1ae1cde 
[https://perma.cc/52BU-J6FC] (describing the challenges states face vying for the same 
resources); Susie Neilson, The Trump Administration Forced States to Bid eBay-Style 
for Masks and Ventilators, According to an Explosive New Documentary, BUS. 
INSIDER (Oct. 20, 2020, 5:31 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/documentary-
trump-made-states-bid-ebay-style-ppe-masks-2020-10 [https://perma.cc/5U4Y-
KKZB]. 
 22. See Glenn Pasanen, Bringing Back the Commuter Tax, GOTHAM GAZETTE 
(Jan. 27, 2003), https://www.gothamgazette.com/index.php/transportation/1673-
bringing-back-the-commuter-tax [https://perma.cc/9AR6-VUWH]. 
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states now take on a much more significant role in funding what was 
once commonly understood to be local public goods.23 
Over the past several decades, political trends have further 
undermined assumptions in the fiscal literature about the roles of 
federal and sub-federal entities in funding government services.24  
While the Affordable Care Act continues to be a significant, relatively 
new source of distributive federal spending,25 Republican control of 
the Senate and the filibuster had, until 2021, otherwise limited the 
growth of federal anti-poverty efforts, even as the deficit grew, both 
during recessionary and expansionary periods.26  Under President 
Obama, Republicans in the Senate stood united in opposition to giving 
the President any legislative victories, even for ones that involved 
significant compromise on their part.27  The crowning achievement of 
unified Republican control in Washington was what has come to be 
 
 23. See Zachary D. Liscow, The Efficiency of Equity in Local Government 
Finance, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1828, 1832 (2017) (“Since the early 1970s, largely 
responding to state supreme court orders, legislatures have mandated vastly increased 
state spending in poor school districts to reduce large inequalities in spending across 
poor and rich locations.”). 
 24. See Yunji Kim & Mildred E. Warner, Shrinking Local Autonomy: Corporate 
Coalitions and Subnational State, 11 CAMBRIDGE J. REGIONS ECON. & SOC’Y 427, 428 
(2018) (“We challenge the old theories of fiscal federalism, which assumed a rational 
allocation of expenditure responsibilities across scales of government, with higher 
scales of government shouldering redistributive functions and lower scales pursuing 
development functions. . . . [T]he subnational state uses the federalist structure to 
dump fiscal responsibilities to lower levels.” (citation omitted)). 
 25. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 
119 (2010); Tara McKay, The Social Costs of Repealing the ACA, HEALTH AFFS. 
(Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20170307.059057/full/ 
[https://perma.cc/6YBQ-CP98] (discussing the distributive impacts of increasing 
insurance access). But see STAN DORN, BOWEN GARRETT & JOHN HOLAHAN, 
REDISTRIBUTION UNDER THE ACA IS MODEST IN SCOPE 1 (2014), 
http://webarchive.urban.org/UploadedPDF/413023-Redistribution-Under-the-ACA-
is-Modest-in-Scope.pdf [https://perma.cc/8X86-HV67] (noting the modesty of the 
ACA’s redistributive impact). 
 26. See Eduardo Porter, The Republican Party’s Strategy to Ignore Poverty, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 27, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/28/business/economy/a-
strategy-to-ignore-poverty.html [https://perma.cc/2PGB-4VBS] (discussing 
Republican policy opposition to expanding safety net programs); David Wessel, How 
Worried Should You Be About the Federal Deficit and Debt?, BROOKINGS INST. (July 
8, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/policy2020/votervital/how-worried-should-you-
be-about-the-federal-deficit-and-debt/ [https://perma.cc/BE5P-Y25J] (showing deficit 
growth since 2000). 
 27. See generally Michael Grunwald, The Victory of ‘No,’ POLITICO (Dec. 4, 2016), 
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/12/republican-party-obstructionism-
victory-trump-214498 [https://perma.cc/S47D-ECWE] (discussing the “success” of this 
strategy). 
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known as the Tax Cut and Jobs Act,28 a policy that ballooned the deficit 
while providing minimal benefits to low- and moderate-income 
Americans.29  But how quickly things change.  With the passage of the 
American Recovery Plan, the 117th Congress committed itself to 
broad-scale, anti-poverty measures, including tax provisions estimated 
to reduce child poverty by more than 40%.30 
In many states, however, legislative majorities skeptical of social 
welfare spending remain ascendant.  Republicans have a governing 
trifecta (control of both the governorship and the state legislature) in 
23 states as of the 2020 election, while Democrats have similar control 
of only 15.31  Many of these Republican trifectas began in the early 
2000s or even earlier.32  At the same time, political polarization has led 
to a Republican party leadership almost uniformly hostile to tax 
increases.33  Of course, Kansas’s bipartisan decision to roll back the 
deep tax cuts imposed earlier this decade suggests that there are limits 
to this tax-cut orthodoxy even among elected officials.34  Republican 
 
 28. Budget Fiscal Year, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017). 
 29. See William G. Gale, A Fixable Mistake: The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, 
BROOKINGS INST. (Sept. 25, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-
front/2019/09/25/a-fixable-mistake-the-tax-cuts-and-jobs-act/ [https://perma.cc/7YJ6-
M5WW] (discussing the deficit increase); Chye-Ching Huang, Fundamentally Flawed 
2017 Tax Law Largely Leaves Low- and Moderate-Income Americans Behind, CTR. 
ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.cbpp.org/federal-
tax/fundamentally-flawed-2017-tax-law-largely-leaves-low-and-moderate-income-
americans [https://perma.cc/2HKA-HSKC] (discussing the distributive impact). 
 30. See CBPP Staff, American Rescue Plan Act Will Help Millions and Bolster the 
Economy, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Mar. 15, 2021), 
https://www.cbpp.org/research/poverty-and-inequality/american-rescue-plan-act-will-
help-millions-and-bolster-the-economy [https://perma.cc/U4JY-KARB]. 
 31. See State Government Trifectas, BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/State_government_trifectas [https://perma.cc/YR98-CMZT] 
(last visited Feb. 22, 2021). 
 32. See id. 
 33. See Vanessa Williamson, How Tax Cuts for the Wealthy Became Republican 
Orthodoxy, WASH. POST (Dec. 21, 2017, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/12/21/how-tax-cuts-for-
the-wealthy-became-republican-orthodoxy/ [https://perma.cc/3QA7-9ET6]. 
 34. See Russell Berman, The Death of Kansas’s Conservative Experiment, 
ATLANTIC (June 7, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/06/kansass-conservative-tax-
experiment-is-dead/529551/ [https://perma.cc/KMZ6-HN4G]. The tax cuts that went 
into effect in 2014 entirely eliminated the taxation of business income earned by 
partnerships and other pass-through entities. Kansas tax revenue shrank by about 10% 
in a single year. See Jeremy Hobson, Dean Russell & Samantha Raphelson, As Trump 
Proposes Tax Cuts, Kansas Deals with Aftermath of Experiment, NPR (Oct. 25, 2017, 
2:55 PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/10/25/560040131/as-trump-proposes-tax-cuts-
kansas-deals-with-aftermath-of-experiment [https://perma.cc/QN2N-WT8G]. 
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voters are actually more divided on this issue.  Polling suggests that a 
small majority of Republican registered voters support increasing taxes 
on the super wealthy.35 
Meanwhile, urban areas have grown more progressive, in part as a 
result of a broader trend of spatialized political polarization and 
demographic differences between rural and urban Americans.36  This 
widening gap between urban political preferences and those of the 
state and (and at times) national governments has meant that 
redistributive policies supported by potentially large national 
majorities and smaller state-level majorities lack support among 
congressional and state-level legislative leadership.  As a result of these 
trends, it is not surprising that local leaders would be at the forefront 
in responding to problems that require a strong public sector response.  
For example, when President Trump announced he was pulling the 
United States out of the Paris Climate Agreement, local leaders 
committed themselves to implementing local policies to reduce U.S. 
carbon admissions.37  Additionally, in many states, mayors and city 
councils implemented mask mandates.  Sometimes these local leaders 
simply moved more quickly than state officials, but in too many cases, 
these local leaders faced hostility and legal challenges from the state.38 
B. Responsibility Without Fiscal Authority 
For years, local governments have faced a rescaling of state 
responsibility.39  As scholars Yunji Kim and Mildred E. Warner argued 
in 2018, “[e]xpenditure responsibility for social welfare has shifted 
 
 35. See Christopher Ingraham, Republicans Support Higher Taxes on the Super-
Rich, According to a Fox News Survey, WASH. POST (Jan. 31, 2019, 1:49 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-policy/2019/01/31/republicans-support-higher-
taxes-super-rich-according-fox-news-survey/ [https://perma.cc/3TJ4-DDW4]. 
 36. See KIM PARKER ET AL., PEW RSCH. CTR., WHAT UNITES AND DIVIDES URBAN, 




 37. See Sarah Fox, Localizing Environmental Federalism, 54 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
133, 140–50 (2020). 
 38. See, e.g., Daniel Arkin et al., More Than Half the Country Has Issued Mask 
Requirements. See If There’s a Mandate in Your State, NBC NEWS (Dec. 10, 2020, 6:01 
PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/more-half-country-has-issued-
mask-requirements-see-if-there-n1234182 [https://perma.cc/K8CC-EBCS]; Max 
Cohen, Georgia Governor Sues to Stop Atlanta Mask Mandate, POLITICO (July 16, 
2020, 6:41 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/07/16/georgia-mayors-brian-
kemp-face-masks-366497 [https://perma.cc/5TFQ-F3HY]. 
 39. See, e.g., Kim & Warner, supra note 24, at 427. 
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from the federal to the state level and increasingly to the local level.”40  
This shift in responsibility has occurred as the pressures of tax and 
expenditure limits and more general political support for lowering 
taxes have shifted state spending.  Even as local governments have 
been asked to do more, state laws have not meaningfully increased 
local access to revenue from the largest tax bases: property taxes, 
general sales taxes, and income taxes.41 
These pressures to rescale are particularly strong during recessions, 
and the Great Recession accelerated this trend.42  However, even in 
the most recent period of economic expansion, many local 
governments faced fiscal pressures, as state aid was slow to recover 
from Great Recession cuts.43  Admittedly, such pressure was not 
universal.  For example, prior to COVID-19, New York City’s budget 
ballooned.44 
For many years, astute policymakers and scholars have suggested 
that local revenue needs be met with a reinvigorated property tax.45  
Even though the property tax is the most important own-source 
revenue stream for local governments,46 its share of local revenues has 
been declining for decades.47  And it is far less important for large, 
 
 40. Id. at 428. 
 41. See generally Erin Adele Scharff, Powerful Cities?: Limits on Municipal Taxing 
Authority and What to Do About Them, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 292 (2016). 
 42. See Kim & Warner, supra note 24, at 429 (“State rescaling theory acknowledges 
that power is shifted upward to international bodies, downward to subnational 
governments and outward to private interests, a process which has intensified with 
austerity since the Great Recession.” (citations omitted)). 
 43. See ‘Lost Decade’ Casts a Post-Recession Shadow on State Finances, PEW 
CHARITABLE TRS. (June 4, 2019), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-
analysis/issue-briefs/2019/06/lost-decade-casts-a-post-recession-shadow-on-state-
finances [https://perma.cc/WD7M-E6YU]; see also Kim & Warner, supra note 24, at 
432. 
 44. See Jeff Coltin, What to Know About NYC’s $92.2 Billion Budget, CITY & ST. 
N.Y. (Feb. 7, 2019), https://www.cityandstateny.com/articles/politics/new-york-
city/bill-de-blasio-2019-budget-hearing.html [https://perma.cc/36WY-2M6L] (New 
York’s 2019 $92.2 billion budget was about $14 billion more than when Mayor deBlasio 
took office). 
 45. See, e.g., DAVID BRUNORI, LOCAL TAX POLICY: A FEDERALIST PERSPECTIVE 
(2013); JOAN YOUNGMAN, A GOOD TAX (2018). 
 46. See What Are the Sources of Revenue for Local Governments?, TAX POL’Y 




 47. See IRIS J. LAV & MICHAEL LEACHMAN, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, 
STATE LIMITS ON PROPERTY TAXES HAMSTRING LOCAL SERVICES AND SHOULD BE 
RELAXED OR REPEALED 4 (2018), 
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general-purpose jurisdictions.48  Advocates of increasing local 
dependence on the property tax, or perhaps more accurately, returning 
to local dependence on the property tax, note that one of its more 
attractive features is its stability: revenue from the property tax does 
not change rapidly with corresponding changes in the economic cycle.49  
For local governments that must balance budgets each year, this 
stability provides a buffer to city budgets during economic downturns.  
Property values are a lagging indicator in most recessions; they do not 
fall as quickly as income or discretionary consumption.50  Further, 
certain property tax assessment features reduce the impact of even 
falling property values on assessments for tax purposes.51 
However, in his recent work, scholar Andrew Hayashi noted that 
this stability creates its own problems for homeowners, particularly 
low-income homeowners, who find their property taxes remain 
constant even as their incomes decline.52  Hayashi’s research suggested 
that this burden forces homeowners to sell their property or otherwise 
make difficult consumption choices.53  Scholars like Bernadette 
Atuahene have highlighted the ways that property assessments are 
disproportionately high for people of color and low-income property 
owners.54  In light of these interacting trends, Hayashi and scholar Ariel 
Jurow Kleiman have cautioned against raising property taxes as a first 
response to the pandemic.55 
In the absence of meaningful control over the property tax, it is 
natural that local governments might turn to the other “main” tax bases 
on which governments rely for own-source revenue, the sales and 




 48. See Tracy Gordon, Richard C. Auxier & Aravind Boddupalli, COVID-19 Has 
Turned Much of What We Thought We Knew About City Finances Upside Down, 
TAX POL’Y CTR. (Sept. 29, 2020), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/covid-19-
has-turned-much-what-we-thought-we-knew-about-city-finances-upside-down 
[https://perma.cc/DK5L-3LD2]. 
 49. See BRUNORI, supra note 45, at 47–48. 
 50. See id. at 47. 
 51. See Andrew T. Hayashi, Countercyclical Property Taxes, 40 VA. TAX REV. 1, 
29–30 (2020). 
 52. See id. at 50. 
 53. See id. at 45. 
 54. See generally Bernadette Atuahene, Predatory Cities, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 107 
(2020). 
 55. See Andrew Hayashi & Ariel Jurow Kleiman, Property Taxes During a 
Pandemic, 96 TAX NOTES ST. 1461 (2020). 
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increased over time,56 local sales taxes piggyback on state sales taxes 
and share many of their undesirable design features, most notably a 
narrow base.57  As for local income taxes, the vast majority of local 
governments simply do not have the authority to levy such taxes.58 
As a result of long-term demographic trends, residents of urban 
jurisdictions are frequently more supportive of an active public sector 
than residents of states as a whole.  As a result, local officials and 
policymakers have embraced a leadership role created in the vacuum 
of state and federal inaction.  In taking up this mantle, however, 
localities often find themselves resource-constrained, as this Section 
discussed.  As a result, local governments have turned increasingly to 
more limited revenue sources to make ends meet. 
II. MAKING ENDS MEET 
Part I described the challenges local governments face in ensuring 
tax revenue is adequate to fund the goods and services constituents 
desired.  This Part considers some of the strategies local governments 
have adopted to keep budgets balanced.  Section II.A looks at the 
growth of “miscellaneous” sources of revenue.  Section II.B considers 
non-revenue budget solutions: borrowing and cutting spending. 
A. Other Revenues 
In the absence of meaningful control over their most significant tax 
bases, including property taxes, general sales taxes, and income taxes, 
local governments are more reliant than state and federal governments 
on what often appears as “miscellaneous taxes/revenue” on budget 
charts.59  In 2017, “charges,” “miscellaneous revenue,” and “other 
taxes” accounted for over a quarter of local government revenues 
nationwide.60  Because school districts and other special districts are 
more reliant on property taxes, the percentage is even greater for 
 
 56. See What Are the Sources of Revenue for Local Governments?, supra note 46. 
 57. See BRUNORI, supra note 45, at 76. Part III discusses this problem further. See 
text accompanying infra notes 152–59 (discussing problems with Philadelphia’s sales 
tax). 
 58. See Pagano & Hoene, supra note 6. 
 59. Compare What Are the Sources of Revenue for Local Governments?, supra 
note 46, with What Are the Sources of Revenue for State Governments?, TAX POL’Y 
CTR. (May 2020), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-are-sources-
revenue-state-governments [https://perma.cc/HHA2-2YVJ], and What Are the 
Sources of Revenue for the Federal Government?, TAX POL’Y CTR. (May 2020), 
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-are-sources-revenue-federal-
government [https://perma.cc/W4XK-LVF7]. 
 60. See What Are the Sources of Revenue for Local Governments?, supra note 46. 
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general-purpose local governments such as cities, towns, and 
counties.61  According to the Tax Policy Center, in the 906 largest cities 
(those with populations over 50,000), 33% of local revenue comes from 
charges, miscellaneous revenue, and other taxes.62  For this set of large 
cities, an additional 5% of revenue is generated by selective sales 
taxes.63  For the 67 U.S. cities with populations over 300,000, this share 
is greater still: such revenue sources account for over 40% of local 
revenue.64 
These miscellaneous and other sources of revenue include parking 
fees, business and event permits, traffic and other safety enforcement 
fines, and tourism taxes and fees, which include air transportation 
charges, hotel, and rental car taxes.65  The combination of revenue 
sources is unique for every city, in part because of the choices local 
voters and elected officials make and in part because each state 
authorizes a different mix of local revenue options.  Further, states 
sometimes authorize different revenue options for different cities 
within the state.  In such cases, larger cities are usually given greater 
revenue authority. 
Consider the City of Atlanta.  Its fiscal year 2020 budget predicted 
$716.7 million in own-source revenue.66  Of that, 32.3% came from 
property taxes, and 17% came from its local option sales tax.67  The 
remaining 51% of Atlanta’s revenue came from miscellaneous revenue 
sources, including public utility, alcoholic beverage, and other taxes; 
license and permit revenue; charges for services; fines, forfeitures, and 
penalties; building rentals and concessions; hotel and motel tax 
revenue; and pilot and franchise fees.68  In addition, the city budget 
predicted 5% of revenue would come from “indirect cost recovery” and 
1% from what it called “other revenue.”69  Atlanta’s property tax 
revenue includes real property taxes, real estate transfer taxes, and 
 
 61. See How Do State and Local Property Taxes Work?, TAX POL’Y CTR. (May 
2020), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/how-do-state-and-local-
property-taxes-work [https://perma.cc/Z93R-G4FP]; see also Gordon et al., supra note 
48. 
 62. How Do State and Local Property Taxes Work?, supra note 61. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See id. 
 66. See CITY OF ATLANTA, FISCAL YEAR 2020 ADOPTED BUDGET 89 (2020), 
https://www.atlantaga.gov/home/showpublisheddocument?id=43234 
[https://perma.cc/7YJY-ND4S]. 
 67. See id. 
 68. See id. 
 69. See id. 
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intangible recording taxes, not simply the ad valorem property tax.70  
The “other taxes” category includes insurance premium taxes and 
motor vehicle taxes.  “Other revenue” includes investment income and 
revenue from the sale of city assets.71  Finally, “indirect cost recovery” 
budgets as revenue the cost of services the city provides its own 
departments.72  As the Atlanta budget document explains, this 
recovery “allocates a portion of general services costs such as 
purchasing, accounting, budgeting, personnel administration, and 
certain other indirect costs based on allocation methodology 
determined by an independent cost allocation plan.”73 
Denver, on the other hand, is far more dependent on its sales and 
use tax.  For fiscal year 2021, the proposed budget anticipated 55% of 
revenue to be collected from the city’s sales and use tax, with only 12% 
collected from its property tax.74  This is not surprising.  Colorado’s 
Taxpayer Bill of Rights, known as TABOR, is a significant constraint 
on tax revenue, and the recently repealed Gallagher amendment 
limited property tax revenue growth by locking in an assessment ratio 
between commercial and residential property.75  After sales revenue, 
miscellaneous revenue represents the next largest portion of Denver’s 
budget; the city anticipates 20% of revenue coming from what the 
budget terms “general government,” a category that includes licenses 
and permits, fines and forfeits, cable franchise fees, interest income, 
fees, charges for services, user charges, internal services and indirect 
 
 70. See id. at 90. 
 71. See id. at 91–94. 
 72. See id. at 95. 
 73. Id. 
 74. CITY & CNTY. OF DENVER, MAYOR’S PROPOSED 2021 BUDGET 78 (2020), 
https://www.denvergov.org/content/dam/denvergov/Portals/344/documents/Budget/20
20/2020BudgetBook_Vol1-2-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/K79W-VQJH]. 
 75. See TOM BROWN, CTR. FOR COLO. POL’Y STUD., THE EFFECTS OF TABOR ON 
MUNICIPAL REVENUES AND SPENDING IN COLORADO (2001), 
http://static.uccs.edu/ccps/sites/ccps/files/inline-files/Municipal%20Article.final_.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GJQ8-ND6L] (discussing the interaction of TABOR and the 
Gallagher Amendment on municipal revenue); Aldo Svaldi, Colorado Homeowners 
Have Among the Lowest Tax Rates in the U.S., but Businesses Say They’re Paying the 
Price, DENVER POST (Oct. 23, 2020, 1:16 PM), 
www.denverpost.com/2020/10/23/colorado-amendment-b-property-tax-burden-
gallagher-amendment/ [https://perma.cc/6NSA-RE8W] (discussing the impact of the 
Gallagher amendment on property taxes); Gallagher Amendment Repeal and 
Property Tax Assessment Rates Measure (2020), BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/Colorado_Amendment_B,_Gallagher_Amendment_Repeal_a
nd_Property_Tax_Assessment_Rates_Measure_(2020) [https://perma.cc/VLD5-
X692] (last visited Mar. 23, 2021) (reporting on repeal of the Gallagher amendment). 
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costs, and investment services.76  An additional 8% of revenue is 
projected from the occupational privilege tax, lodgers (hotel) tax, 
motor vehicle taxes, and telecommunication taxes.77 
To be sure, some cities are far less reliant on this miscellaneous 
revenue.  For example, Nashville projected that its property tax would 
raise almost 60% of city revenue in the 2020–2021 budget year, and 
over 30% of its revenue would be generated by the sales tax and 
intergovernmental aid and grants.78  As a result, miscellaneous revenue 
sources accounted for less than 10% of the city budget.79 
As Tracy Gordon and her co-authors noted, prior to this recession, 
cities that rely on more diverse revenue streams were generally seen as 
winners in local fiscal policy.80  These localities had developed revenue 
sources that responded to the shrinking property tax base by 
supplementing property tax revenue with revenue from sales taxes and 
other sources.81  However, for local governments that rely on sales 
taxes — especially selective sales taxes — to supplement property tax 
revenue, 2020 revenue projections fell far short of collection as 
shutdown orders and consumer fear reduced consumption and tourism 
fell dramatically.82 
But such revenue models were under pressure even before the 
pandemic.  Over 15 years ago, scholar Laurie Reynolds trenchantly 
criticized local reliance on user fees as a “you get what you pay for” 
model of local government.83  She noted that local reliance on user fees 
shifts both who gets local services and what kind of services local 
governments can deliver, making it harder to provide services that 
engage in redistribution or services that provide non-rival public 
goods.84  Numerous challenges to local user fees have since been 
 
 76. See CITY & CNTY. OF DENVER, supra note 74, at 78–79. 
 77. See id. 
 78. METRO. GOV’T OF NASHVILLE & DAVIDSON CNTY., RECOMMENDED 
OPERATING BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2020–2021 A-12 (2020), 
https://www.nashville.gov/Portals/0/SiteContent/Finance/docs/OMB/fy21_budget/Rec
ommended/FY21RecommendedBudgetBook.pdf [https://perma.cc/D3FZ-5RG9]. 
 79. See id. 
 80. See Gordon et al., supra note 48. 
 81. See id. 
 82. See Christiana McFarland & Brenna Rivett, Cities Anticipate $360 Billion 
Revenue Shortfall, NAT’L LEAGUE CITIES (May 14, 2020), 
https://www.nlc.org/article/2020/05/14/cities-anticipate-360-billion-revenue-shortfall/ 
[https://perma.cc/7A3Y-NTTC]. 
 83. See generally Laurie Reynolds, Taxes, Fees, Assessments, Dues, and the “Get 
What You Pay For” Model of Local Government, 56 FLA. L. REV. 373 (2004). 
 84. See id. at 407–15; see also Michael Hiltzik, The Next Crisis for California Will 
Be the Affordability of Water, L.A. TIMES (July 7, 2017, 2:20 PM), 
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brought by plaintiffs alleging that the fees are taxes in disguise given 
that they are not calculated with the necessary precision to reflect the 
costs incurred in providing the good or service for which the fee was 
charged.85  While not all of these challenges have been successful, such 
challenges collectively limit the government’s ability to adopt fee 
schedules that fully reflect the costs borne by the city or the services 
the city offers.86 
A separate and significant body of scholarship criticizes local use of 
and reliance on criminal justice and traffic fines and fees.87  Such fines 
and fees reflect the racial disparities endemic to our criminal justice 
system.  People of color are much more likely to face such fines and 
fees in part as a result of enforcement disparities.88  However, other 
factors contribute to the problem as well.  One study suggested that the 
“one demographic that was most characteristic of cities that levy large 
amounts of fines on their citizens [is] a large African American 
population.”89  According to that study, “[a]mong the fifty cities with 
the highest proportion of revenues from fines, the median size of the 
African American population — on a percentage basis — is more than 
five times greater than the national median.”90 
Those with low incomes face potentially significant financial 
obstacles due to this regressive method of raising revenue.  Not only 
are the fines and fees a much larger share of income for those living at 
or close to the poverty line, those lacking the funds to immediately pay 
these fines must often bear high interest rates and pay fees to enter 
 
https://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-water-afford-20170709-
story.html [https://perma.cc/Z4MT-8TSU] (discussing the way Proposition 218 limits 
the ability of water districts to subsidize pricing). 
 85. See generally Erin Adele Scharff, Green Fees, 97 NEB. L. REV. 168 (2018). 
 86. See id.; see also Jason Ruiz, Tied Up in Appeals, Litigation over Water Fees 
Could Deepen City’s Fiscal Pain, LONG BEACH POST NEWS (July 29, 2020, 3:55 PM), 
https://lbpost.com/news/tied-up-in-appeals-litigation-over-water-fees-could-deepen-
citys-fiscal-pain [https://perma.cc/2RKN-MAZD] (discussing challenges facing Long 
Beach during the pandemic because of legal challenges to its water fee structures). 
 87. See, e.g., Ariel Jurow Kleiman, Nonmarket Criminal Justice Fees, 71 HASTINGS 
L.J. 517 (2020). 
 88. See BACK ON THE RD. CAL., STOPPED, FINED, ARRESTED: RACIAL BIAS IN 
POLICING AND TRAFFIC COURTS IN CALIFORNIA 21 (2016), http://ebclc.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/04/Stopped_Fined_Arrested_BOTRCA.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NY6P-8LKG]. 
 89. Dan Kopf, The Fining of Black America, PRICEONOMICS (June 24, 2016), 
https://priceonomics.com/the-fining-of-black-america/ [https://perma.cc/EM3G-
GRA7]. 
 90. Id. 
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repayment programs.91  In far too many jurisdictions, failure to pay 
such fines and fees can result in the suspension of driver’s licenses, 
making it more difficult for those individuals to commute to work.92  In 
some jurisdictions, failure to pay can even result in incarceration, which 
in a sad irony can result in additional fines and fees.93 
At least in some jurisdictions, enforcement priorities reflect 
jurisdictions’ search for revenue.  In the wake of the shooting of 
Michael Brown by a Ferguson, Missouri, police officer, the U.S. 
Department of Justice investigated Ferguson’s Police Department.  
That investigation uncovered damning emails that revealed both casual 
racism in daily correspondence and the importance of revenue in 
Ferguson policing decisions.94  But not all of this budgeting happens in 
secret.  Chicago tried to balance its budget using additional 
enforcement revenue.95 
Finally, many local governments rely on a set of selective sales taxes 
and user fees imposed primarily on tourists and the tourist industry.96  
The taxes include room occupancy taxes, lodging taxes, a variety of 
rental car fees and taxes, and taxes on restaurant meals that are also 
borne by locals.97  Because such taxes are paid by non-residents, they 
have proven politically popular.  In recent years, both state and local 
governments have increasingly imposed or raised tourist taxes.98  
However, this has been an especially terrible year for tourism.99  As a 
 
 91. See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, FINES, FEES, AND BAIL: PAYMENTS IN THE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM THAT DISPROPORTIONATELY IMPACT THE POOR 3 (2015). 
 92. See id. at 4. 
 93. See U.S. COMM’N ON C.R., TARGETED FINES AND FEES AGAINST COMMUNITIES 
OF COLOR 38 (2017). 
 94. See C.R. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE 
DEPARTMENT 2 (2015). 
 95. See Mayor Lori Lightfoot’s ‘Pandemic Budget’ for 2021 Cleared the Chicago 
City Council. Here Are 5 Things to Know, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 24, 2020, 5:40 PM) 




 96. See ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELS., REVENUE 
DIVERSIFICATION: STATE AND LOCAL TRAVEL TAXES (1994), 
https://library.unt.edu/gpo/acir/Reports/information/M-189.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/K4K9-AXEZ]. 
 97. See id. at 2. 
 98. See Elaine S. Povich, States Lure Tourists, Then Tax Them, PEW CHARITABLE 
TRS. (June 15, 2015), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-
analysis/blogs/stateline/2015/6/15/states-lure-tourists-then-tax-them 
[https://perma.cc/J8PD-8PU5]. 
 99. See Barb Rosewicz & Mike Maciag, Pandemic-Driven Declines in Tourism 
Take Toll on Many States’ Revenues, PEW CHARITABLE TRS. (Oct. 14, 2020), 
936 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLVIII 
result, jurisdictions for which out-of-town visitors play a significant role 
in revenue find themselves struggling with significant unemployment 
within the tourism industry and sharply reduced tax revenue.100 
But local reliance on tourism taxes creates problems even when local 
governments are not facing a global pandemic.  For one thing, tourism 
is quite cyclical, so revenue from tourism taxes can fall quickly in 
economic downturns.  In the long economic expansion from the end of 
the Great Recession to March 2020, tourism was, of course, a growth 
industry;101 however, the Great Recession was also a period of 
significant decline in both business and leisure travel.102  The cyclical 
nature of tourism taxes is not the only problem with this revenue 
source.  Not all jurisdictions will be able to rely (or rely to the same 
extent) on such revenues, and those cities without a significant tourism 
industry cannot rely on tourism taxes.  Not only does this produce clear 
winners and losers, but it may also undermine potential intra-
jurisdictional efforts to reform local revenue options more broadly. 
Further, recent events have brought a sea change in tourist patterns 
to which local tax systems are only beginning to respond.  The 
emergence of transportation networking companies and the short-term 
rental industry has threatened the dominance of the rental car and 
hotel industries103 and the tax revenue these industries contribute to 




[https://perma.cc/ME2R-VXAM] (looking at the state budget picture, although a 
similar analysis applies to cities). 
 100. See id. 
 101. See Hugo Martín, Coronavirus Could Inflict Biggest Blow to Travel Industry 
Since Great Recession, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2020, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2020-03-06/coronavirus-travel-industry-great-
recession [https://perma.cc/ZJP7-4ZV3]. 
 102. See Geoffrey Paulin, Travel Expenditures, 2005–2011: Spending Slows During 
Recent Recession, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT.: BEYOND NOS. (Dec. 2012), 
https://www.bls.gov/opub/btn/volume-1/travel-expenditures-2005-2011-spending-
slows-during-recent-recession.htm [https://perma.cc/5XRV-TSAX]; see also U.S. 




 103. See Jiyong Park, How the Sharing Economy Changes the Tourism Landscape: 
The Complementary Impacts of Airbnb and Uber/Lyft, PAC. ASIA CONF. ON INFO. SYS. 
2, 3 (2020). 
 104. See Jordan E.A. Ferguson, Christy Gunvalsen & Rebecca L. Moon, Uber, 
Airbnb and Municipalities: Maximizing New Tax and Licensing Revenue 
Opportunities, STRAFFORD (Oct. 5, 2016, 1:00 PM), 
http://media.straffordpub.com/products/uber-airbnb-and-municipalities-maximizing-
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for revenue raising, this shift might have had less of a budget impact.  
But most tourist taxes are selective, meaning they apply only to 
narrowly defined bands of activity.  As a result, companies like Airbnb 
and Uber have argued that they should not be subject to the taxes 
imposed on their more traditional competitors.105  Legislation can 
always catch up to these changing industry dynamics.  Still, the sharing 
economy has also proven itself adept at securing legislative victories 
for itself at both the state and local levels.106  The ascendance of these 
industries may suggest a potential limit to growth in tourism taxes. 
As this Part suggests, local governments have been adept at finding 
new sources of revenue to supplement traditional reliance on the 
property tax.  However, many of these revenue sources raise serious 
issues of equity and stability.  Of course, growth in such 
“miscellaneous” revenue is not the only option for cities facing fiscal 
constraints.  As the next Section discusses, local governments can both 
borrow funds and cut services to make ends meet. 
B. Other Budget Options: Borrowing and Shifting Funding Priorities 
Raising own-source revenue via taxes and fees is not the only option 
cities have for balancing their budgets.  Cities can consider borrowing 
and cutting spending as well.  Cities also incur debt for capital costs, 
i.e., the costs of building and maintaining long-lived assets like city 
buildings and public roads,107 as it makes little sense to finance such 
 
new-tax-and-licensing-revenue-opportunities-2016-10-05/presentation.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2FEF-ULZW]; Brian Hardzinski & Adam Brooks, ‘Gig Economy’ 
Businesses Like Uber, Airbnb a Complex Revenue Source for Oklahoma City, KGOU 
(Aug. 21, 2015), https://www.kgou.org/post/gig-economy-businesses-uber-airbnb-
complex-revenue-source-oklahoma-city [https://perma.cc/93P8-NBSP]; Kirk Miller, 
Your Uber Ride from the Airport May Get More Expensive. Here’s Why., 
INSIDEHOOK (Feb. 19, 2020, 11:47 AM), 
https://www.insidehook.com/daily_brief/travel/lyft-uber-airport-fees 
[https://perma.cc/9CWV-LDLC]. 
 105. See Jonathan J. Cooper, Official Says Phoenix Airport Ride-Hailing Fee Is 
Illegal, ABC NEWS (Jan. 16, 2020, 7:02 PM), 
https://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory/official-phoenix-airport-ride-hailing-fee-
illegal-68340156 [https://perma.cc/BZ2Q-U7KM]; Paris Martineau, Inside Airbnb’s 
‘Guerilla War’ Against Local Governments, WIRED (Mar. 20, 2019, 7:00 AM), 
https://www.wired.com/story/inside-airbnbs-guerrilla-war-against-local-governments/ 
[https://perma.cc/PGC5-LLJB]. 
 106. See generally Brad Stone, The $99 Billion Idea, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK 
(Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2017-uber-airbnb-99-billion-
idea/ [https://perma.cc/Q99L-NCVT]. 
 107. See Policy Basics: State and Local Borrowing, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y 
PRIORITIES (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.cbpp.org/research/state-budget-and-
tax/policy-basics-state-and-local-borrowing [https://perma.cc/63CN-XQV9]. 
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projects out of a single year’s revenue.  However, borrowing to cover 
operating expenses is generally viewed as a last resort of financially 
desperate cities.108  Such borrowing only postpones a reckoning 
between fiscal capacity and service provision — a reckoning made 
more difficult as debt service adds additional costs but does not 
contribute to current city services.109  In the context of this particular 
recession, however, some scholars have argued that this traditional 
advice should not be heeded given the pressing service needs and the 
likelihood that investments in human services might forestall further 
economic decline.110 
Even if borrowing for operating expenses is generally controversial, 
it is also quite common, at least in a sense.  Underfunding pensions by 
paying less into pension funds than a reasonable discount rate might 
require is also a kind of borrowing against future revenues.  Pension 
obligations, of course, are not legal borrowing in the sense they are not 
secured debt.111  Nevertheless, pensions, like borrowing to cover 
operating costs, allow governments to fund current services without 
current revenue because the full cost of providing those services is 
delayed by postponing a portion of municipal employee compensation 
into the future.  This form of borrowing is common for two reasons.  
First, pensions are not subject to the same constitutional restrictions as 
traditional, secured borrowing.112  Second, they were historically 
funded on a pay-as-you-go basis, i.e., local governments simply paid 
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 109. See Liz Farmer, The 7 Deadly Sins of Public Finance, GOVERNING (June 2014), 
https://www.governing.com/finance101/gov-deadly-public-finance-sins.html 
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HEALTH COSTS CREATE UNNECESSARY ALARM 2–4 (2011), 
https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/1-20-11sfp.pdf 
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their pension obligations out of their annual budgets.113  The push to 
pre-fund pension obligations began only in the 1970s and 1980s, as the 
failure of private-sector pensions spurred regulatory reform in the 
private sector and put pressure on public pensions to change their 
practices.114 
The scope of the municipal pension problem is a much-debated 
question, as measuring the extent of underfunding requires making 
assumptions about the future, and there is significant disagreement 
about what assumptions are appropriate.115  Most analysts would 
agree, however, that the COVID-19 recession has exacerbated existing 
challenges and that there will be pressure on local governments to 
reduce their payments to pension funds to resolve current budget 
shortfalls.116  Whether or not this strategy makes sense in the short 
term, existing pension liabilities certainly make additional borrowing 
for operating expenses even less attractive.  While solutions to local 
pension problems are beyond the scope of this short Essay, it seems 
likely that they will require at least some additional budget outlays 
toward pension obligations.117  Such outlays will place additional 
pressure on local budgets. 
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In addition to increasing revenues and borrowing to close budget 
gaps, local governments can also cut spending.  In fact, spending cuts 
are a common local response to revenue declines in a recession,118 and 
at the state level, governments also often cut taxes during recessions.119 
Even without these recessionary pressures, reductions in public 
sector spending have long been a goal of conservative movement 
activists.120  This theory of tax cuts is often referred to as the “starve 
the beast” strategy.121  Tax cuts at the federal level have not 
meaningfully reduced spending, as some conservatives have 
bemoaned.122  At the state level, however, laws imposing restrictions 
on tax rate increases have succeeded in both reducing spending and 
shifting some costs onto local governments.123  Another study 
concluded that local tax limits lead to increasing state aid; when limits 
are placed on state governments, public spending overall is 
constrained.124  Despite their mixed record of effectiveness, such limits 
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and associated calls for shrinking government budgets have long been 
associated with conservative politics. 
In the summer of 2020, however, the strength of the Black Lives 
Matter protests amplified progressive voices urging significant 
reductions in public safety expenditures.  In 2017, municipal 
governments spent 13% of their budgets on their police departments.125  
When accounting for municipal courts and municipally-funded 
incarceration, the criminal justice budget increases to over 15% of 
municipal budgets.126  (Because counties primarily pay for 
incarceration, they spend almost 20% of their budgets on the criminal 
justice system).127  A Bloomberg News analysis of cities suggested that 
many large cities spend more than a quarter of their budgets on 
police.128 
Determining how much a community spends on policing compared 
to other priorities can be difficult to disentangle.  As Richard Auxier 
explained, “a key challenge in translating police spending data is 
merely our system of governance.  In short, different governments 
deliver different services — and it varies by state.”129  In Los Angeles, 
both the city and the county engage in policing, but independent school 
districts fund most public education,130 while New York City itself 
funds both policing and schools directly.131  Public data on police 
spending likely also does not account for the money local governments 
spend litigating, settling, and paying out damages in police misconduct 
cases.132  Such expenses are not trivial.  Over a ten-year period, Chicago 
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spent over a half-billion dollars in damage and settlement costs, and 
additional money in litigation expenses.133 
I support efforts to shift funding away from the criminal justice 
system and toward human services expenditures.  Such a shift would 
both advance racial justice and local fiscal health.  However, such 
efforts are unlikely to provide a panacea for local revenue problems.  
For one, such reductions remain an uphill battle.  Though some cities, 
like Austin, have made significant cuts to their police budgets,134 even 
the high-profile efforts to cut the Minneapolis Police Department in 
the wake of George Floyd’s murder have led to only a small shift in the 
city’s budget.135  In many cities, police budgets have grown.136  Such 
growth may represent path dependence as much as political will.  Calls 
to shift local funding priorities happened too late in many city budget 
processes, and some cities had scheduled increases due to union 
contracts.137 
“Public safety” spending is often spared the full impact of budget 
cuts that affect other city departments in times of economic decline.  
During the Great Recession, for example, state and local governments 
focused their spending reductions on education, health, and social 
services.138  While there were cuts to police departments in many 
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jurisdictions,139 those cuts were not as deep as cuts to other 
programs.140 
That the fiscal shortfalls caused by the current COVID-19 recession 
have not resulted in meaningful reductions in police spending suggests 
the magnitude of the problem.  For example, Chicago, facing one of 
the largest shortfalls in the country, closed much of its budget gap by 
refinancing existing loans.141  Chicago Mayor Lori Lightfoot rejected 
calls to defund the police, reaching a deal to make cuts only by 
attrition.142  In fact, the ultimate budget that passed included an 
increase in revenue from traffic and public safety code enforcement.143  
As discussed previously, local reliance on these fines and fees is an 
inequitable way of raising revenue. 
Further, unfunded pension obligations mean that even significant 
decreases in current police spending will not allow cities to quickly shift 
their spending priorities, as cities need revenue to pay for the already 
incurred pension obligations of police officers.144  Resolving these 
pension problems will take creativity on the part of local elected and 
union officials. 
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III. A WAY FORWARD 
As cities seek options for a more stable fiscal path going forward,  
reforming city revenue sources should be a central part of the agenda.  
As discussed above, re-prioritizing local spending is an important part 
of the budget conversation, but it is likely that once federal aid stops 
flowing, cities may find themselves continuing to face fiscal challenges.  
What then is the path forward?  Cities need access to better designed, 
broad-based taxes.  Miscellaneous revenue is not an effective tax 
system, and reliance on these sources creates a host of problems and 
challenges. 
Advocates and policymakers interested in local revenue should 
continue to pursue changes in the property tax that would both grant 
local governments more control over property tax revenue and make 
the property tax more efficient, but calls for such reforms should be 
complemented by advocacy and research focused on expanding local 
legal authority to impose income and sales taxes.  There are currently 
18 states that provide only property tax authorization for local 
governments and one state that authorizes only a sales tax.145  Only one 
state, Alabama, authorizes all three broad-based taxes for local 
governments.146 
An additional five cities have such authorization even though other 
local governments in their state do not: New York City, Yonkers, 
Philadelphia, Kansas City, and St. Louis.147  The list of cities that 
provide expanded fiscal authority perhaps offers its own cautionary 
tale.  While New York City’s tax base allowed it to significantly expand 
its budget prior to the pandemic, the city still has unresolved pension 
and retirement benefits issues,148 and Philadelphia experienced a 
period of significant fiscal distress that led to a nearly three-decade 
period of state oversight over local finances.149  That state supervision 
is set to expire,150 but even prior to the pandemic, experts at the Pew 
Charitable Trusts Philadelphia Research project noted that “[f]iscal 
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responsibility, spending, and taxes continue[] to be major concerns for 
Philadelphia’s government.”151  St. Louis has authority to impose a 
variety of taxes, but state constitutional restrictions require the city to 
seek voter approval to raise tax rates, constraining revenue growth.152  
Plainly, the legal authority to impose any property, sales, or income tax 
is not sufficient to provide for local fiscal health; the taxes themselves 
(and thus their statutory authorization) must also be well-designed. 
Philadelphia’s story is illustrative.  No one suggests Philadelphia as 
a model city for local budgets or revenue.  Philadelphia’s property tax 
has long been criticized for its poor design.  The state’s constitutional 
uniformity provision makes it legally impossible for the city to impose 
different tax rates on different classes of property.153  Thus, 
homeowners and commercial property owners face the same tax rates, 
limiting the ability of the city to raise additional property tax 
revenue.154 
State law allows Philadelphia, and no other city in the state, to 
impose an additional local sales tax, 155 but Philadelphia’s sales tax 
mirrors the state’s.156  In an effort to compete with neighboring 
Delaware, which imposes no sales tax, Pennsylvania is one of a handful 
of states that exempts most clothing purchases from the sales tax, and, 
like in most states, the sales tax also does not apply to most services.157  
As a result of shifts in personal consumption,158 Pennsylvania’s sales 
tax applies to a decreasing share of consumer expenditures. 
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Finally, “local income taxes” in Pennsylvania are imposed on the 
narrow base of wage income, leading Philadelphia to impose additional 
business taxes to capture revenue from some pass-through 
businesses.159  The narrowness of the wage tax base is criticized by 
progressives, and the array of small business taxes vexes business 
owners.160  The system is so complicated that the tax-skeptical Tax 
Foundation has endorsed the city moving toward a broader, more 
traditional income tax base.161  Thus, just as local reliance on the 
property tax has been made more difficult by state-imposed limits on 
assessment growth, rate changes, and revenue growth, state law also 
can impose poor design-choices on local general sales and local income 
taxes. 
Further, for some jurisdictions, access to new, more reliable sources 
of revenue will not be enough to combat years of reduced fiscal 
capacity.  Historian Destin Jenkins has described how, in the wake of 
white flight from cities, borrowing costs for these jurisdictions 
increased, making the cost of investing in public infrastructure much 
higher.162  As a result, residents in these jurisdictions faced a greater 
tax burden.163  Because the historical default rate of cities is incredibly 
low, these discrepancies were likely not justified by increased credit 
risk.164  Concerns for city fiscal health cannot ignore the ways local 
fiscal health reflects longstanding racial inequities that make it 
impossible for even expanded local taxing authority to provide needed 
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Other historic and continuing inequities are reflected in the high 
poverty rates in many of the United States’ urban areas.  For example, 
the poverty rate in Flint, Michigan, is almost 40%;165 in 2018, the 
poverty rate in Shreveport-Bossier (the third-largest metro area in 
Louisiana) was 22.2%.166  In these communities, poverty both creates a 
need for significant public investment in social services and limits the 
ability of the city to raise own-source revenue.  Where property values 
are low, communities must impose high property tax rates to raise 
revenue.  Such high tax rates can result in foreclosures of owner-
occupied housing in low-income communities, further eroding the tax 
base and increasing economic instability in these communities.167  Such 
poverty rates also limit the revenue potential of local sales and income 
taxes. 
For these jurisdictions, increased state and federal spending is 
necessary.  Only a portion of this investment would need to be in the 
form of intragovernmental aid.  The expanded federal funding of anti-
poverty programs contained in the American Recovery Plan is an 
important first step toward address the human services needs in these 
communities; reducing poverty would go a long way to improving fiscal 
outcomes in many areas, both urban and rural.  At the same time, 
ensuring the equitable provision of basic local services, such as water 
and fire services, likely requires intra-government aid to supplement 
locally raised revenue. 
CONCLUSION 
The National League of City’s 21st Century Home Rule project, on 
which I am a co-author, recommends states provide a fiscal equity 
provision to home rule law that guarantees state support to provide a 
minimal level of local services.168  Whether or not such a legal 
guarantee is enacted, some urban areas will need additional investment 
in one form or another.  Thus, this Essay ends where it begins.  While 
some urban areas can survive and thrive in an era of unreliable 
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federalism, many other urban communities need investments that 
likely can only be made by state and federal governments.  Reforms to 
local revenue authority and a reinvigorated system of fiscal federalism 
will be necessary to help all communities thrive.  Hopefully we are at 
the precipice of such changes. 
